Introduction
THE relation between phenomenology, Kant, and Kantian philosophizing broadly con strued (historically and systematically), has been a mainstay in phenomenological re search.
1 This mutual testing of both philosophies is hardly surprising given phenomenology's promise to provide a wholly novel type of philosophy. In the first decades of the twentieth century, if there was one "classical" form of philosophy to play off against, it was the philosophy inaugurated by Kant. Kant was the main philosopher anybody writing in German had to contend with, and since the movement promoting Kant, neo-Kantianism, was the most dominant philosophical movement at the time, this was the main sounding board for the proponents of phenomenology. If one had to choose an enemy for one's own "liberation narrative," it would have to be Kant and his succes sors.
A few words are in order regarding with whom exactly phenomenology is to be contrast ed. At the time phenomenology surged, Kant was represented by neo-Kantianism, which was anything but a unified movement. Part of the methodological challenge in assessing sirable, separating each phenomenologist's and Kant's and neo-Kantian's views on them would be an all-too arduous task. Instead, I have opted to present the two main phenomenologists', Husserl's and Heidegger's, reactions to Kant and the neo-Kantians, restricting myself to the main discussions between them. I will spend more time on Husserl than Heidegger, since I believe that Kant and the neo-Kantians were more impor tant to Husserl than to Heidegger; though Kant was a constant companion on the latter's path of thought. Heidegger's reading of Kant is rather a matter of setting straight the record about who Kant "really" was. I believe this is the most fruitful approach for an en try path into this jungle. Other phenomenologists have dealt with Kant and the neo-Kan tians, for instance Max Scheler and Eugen Fink; as well Jean-Paul Sartre, Paul Ricoeur, and others in the French tradition. In confining myself to the "classical" phenomenolo gists, their views are representative for a first overview and apply cum grano salis to most phenomenologists.
Husserl
Husserl's relation to Kant as well as to neo-Kantianism can be summed up in his own words in a letter to Cassirer of 1925:
In my own development, originally hostile towards Kant . . . I first started out from
Descartes and from there moved to the pre-Kantian philosophy of the eighteenth century . . . However, when I, driven by the basic problem in theory of science most dear to me as a mathematician to ever new problems in a necessary conse quence, made a breakthrough to the method of eidetic analysis of conscious ness . . . when, with the phenomenological reduction, the realm of the fundamen tal sources of all cognition opened up before me, at that point I had to acknowl edge that this science developing before my eyes, although in an entirely different method, encompassed the total Kantian problematic (a problematic which only now received a deeper and clearer sense), and that it confirmed Kant's main re sults in rigorous scientific grounding . . . After having learned to see Kant from my own perspective, I can now also-and especially in the most recent years-receive rich instructions from Kant and the true Kantians. (Husserl 1994: 4) 7 (p. 48) What is, "the total Kantian problematic" which, in Husserl's hands, has taken on a "deeper and clearer sense"? This main problematic can be divided into a few key aspects that will be considered separately. Let us turn to Kant first.
Kant
As Husserl mentions, he was inimical towards Kant in his early phase, but once he had es tablished the main lines of his phenomenological "system," he sought contact with Kant and discovered that he moved, in general, in the same framework, but with some signifi cant improvements. There are, I think, three main substantial moves:
8 from formal to ma terial a priori; from sensible to categorial intuition; from deduction to reduction. I take these to be the crucial elements of Kant's philosophy, where Husserl made positive im provements over Kant. All aspects taken together result in Husserl's notion of transcen dental idealism, which is not a separate topic, but the total consequence of these points.
But all of these may be prefaced by an important methodological difference between Kant and Husserl.
Philosophy as science:
In the above quoted passage a methodological difference is hinted at, but can be missed easily: Husserl says that Kant's results had been confirmed by him self, but in a "rigorous scientific grounding." Put differently, Husserl accuses Kant of not being rigorous enough, and this is quite a reproach to someone who insists on bringing metaphysics on the path "to a science" (see Kant 2004) for the very first time. The con trast between both here may be an instructive start.
What Kant means by science in the famous formulation from Prolegomena is to bring phi losophy on the same path to science that natural science had already undergone in modernity through Newton's canonization of physics under the method of mathematics.
In Kant's narrative, the transition to modern science is marked by the fact that in natural science, mathematics, and not empirical induction, could be used to reach synthetic a pri ori results, when applying pure mathematics to empirically experienced nature. Not all of natural science is a priori, but it can be a priori to the extent that it applies a priori laws to nature: "Now we are nevertheless actually in possession of a pure natural science, which, a priori and with all of the necessity required for apodictic propositions, pro pounds laws to which nature is subject" (Kant 2004: 47) . Hence, what Kant celebrated about modern science is that it, too (besides pure mathematics), could achieve synthetic a priori truths with respect to objects of experience (and not just (p. 49) imagined objects in geometrical space). Thus, what characterizes "science" for Kant is the possible attain ment of synthetic a priori judgments.
For Kant, the upshot of this understanding of "scientific" is that philosophy, too, should be made fit to attain these kinds of truths (cf. CPR, B xviiif.). But this hopefulness has to be taken restrictively. For, metaphysics' traditional claim to provide secure truth with re spect to "absolute" objects, such as God, has been forever thwarted by Kant's transcen dental idealism. According to the latter, we can only speak meaningfully about, and have cognition with respect to, objects of experience. Philosophy has no privilege over the sci ences in its ability to forge a special access to things in themselves. Hence, the notion that philosophy could provide judgments with respect to "metaphysical" objects in the way that other scientific disciplines cannot, is rejected. The only thing philosophy, as metaphysics, can do is to show how any talk about absolute objects is meaningless, al though their transformation into ideas of reason guiding our actions is a crucial part of Kant's critique of traditional metaphysics. Philosophy cannot reach synthetic judgments a priori about its own domain (as a realm of possible experience), because there exists no such domain; instead, it secures the judgments made in the sciences insofar as they uti lize the language of mathematics, and it justifies the legitimacy of modern science's claim to synthetic a priori cognition.
Husserl's notion of scientific as a predicate for philosophy differs vastly. Already from his 1911 essay "Philosophy as Rigorous Science," it is clear what Husserl means by "scientif ic," by contrast with those attempts that betray the very notion of scientificity: psycholo gism in logic and historicism in the human sciences. Both reduce ideal truth to either oc currences in an individual mind or to historical events. They misconstrue the notion of truth as being ideal and true-in-itself, no matter what kind of consciousness grasps it. For Husserl, philosophy can be a science, a rigorous (a priori) one, since it can reach truths about its own, peculiar subject matter: ideal entities that are not part of the domain of logic or mathematics.
While Kant would have rejected the very notion that philosophy has its own subject do main, a proper realm of experience, this is exactly what Husserl claims. If philosophy un derstands its task correctly, to clarify the epistemological grounds for all sciences ("first philosophy"), it must see that it can do so, or only do so, while maintaining that philoso phy has its own subject domain where this can be achieved: this is the realm of experi ence on the part of the cognizing subject. 9 Hence, epistemology must become an investi gation of that subject which has cognition (and besides cognition, also feelings, willings, judgments, memories, and so forth). If all scientific disciplines are by definition worldly disciplines-they investigate a realm in the world-then philosophy, as phenomenology, is an investigation into that realm which has the world as the correlate of its experience.
Moreover, its investigation is scientific, rigorously scientific, when it understands that the truths it can furnish with respect to its subject matter, (p. 50) consciousness, are ideal as well. Hence we glean the notion of phenomenology as an ideal science of a subject do main wholly its own: consciousness in its having of the world.
From formal to material a priori: Kant claims to have redefined how cognition comes about through the two stems of cognition, sensibility and understanding. Through the un derstanding, the active part of the subject, the human mind is able to connect what is giv en in sensibility with forms of thought, categories, to make cognition possible. Hence Kant's famous statement, "thoughts without content are dumb, intuitions without con cepts are blind" (Kant 1965: 94/B 75) . Both need to work together to yield the conditions of the possibility for experience and hence cognition. Sensibility and concepts are the conditions of the possibility for cognition, and both function as forms, that, once filled with content, make possible their execution. Sensibility is the form of (possible) sensible content, while reason is the place where (possible) concepts reside that can be connected to what is given in sensibility. Both are the conditions of the possibility of any experience, hence a priori, and both are by necessity formal. They are the forms for possible sensible experience and forms of possible conceptual thought. Hence, to Kant, the status of a pri ori is necessarily bound up with its formality. This can also be seen in the moral law, which is the formal law of the categorical imperative. First, take the case of external experience, which to Kant involves space and time as forms of intuition. Husserl would expand here; external experience of a spatiotemporal object necessarily involves a consciousness experiencing it, but a consciousness that is not merely a thinking subject but one that is, necessarily, embodied, with the capacity to walk around it, touch it, have corresponding eye movements. The body, accordingly, is more than just a physical body, but is the locus for subjectivity. The subject functions in her body, it is the organ of experience and willful actions. No external perception is possi ble without a body as an integral part of the experience of the physical, external world.
But a body is necessarily material, it is flesh. Hence, the body-not in the sense of a physi cal body, a Körper, but as a lived-body, a Leib-is the necessary, but material condition of the possibility for external experience. The eidetic proof of this claim can (p. 51) be demonstrated in that it is also present in a phantasized permutation of experience, for in stance, when I imagine myself as an animal in a jungle. Thus, even in eidetic variation of external experience, the body might be modified, but cannot be thought away, hence it is necessary.
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Second, in his ethical reflections, Husserl insists that there is also a material a priori ele ment in moral contexts. Indeed, there are a priori elements in ethical situations, such that a situation I find myself in, harbors a priori the right means for action. Hence, his cate gorical imperative, inspired by Brentano, "do the best among the attainable in a given sit uation" (Husserl 1988: 129, italics added) , implies that there is such a best course of ac tion given the situation one finds oneself in. This is not a priori in the sense of a universal izable maxim, but in the situation itself, which demands a certain action, indeed the "best action" for a given agent. Since every situation supposedly has its options for what can be done contained in it, the situation is governed by material a priori laws. While the cate gorical imperative Husserl formulates is formal in the sense that it demands the choice of the best option among the attainable ones, its choice by necessity implies material ele ments that the situation itself provides, which are necessary for the individual in it.
Hence, everybody has her individual categorical imperative necessary for her exclusively.
Thus, if phenomenology is an ideal science, its claims are a priori, but many of its find ings are material of the sort indicated; they are necessary elements of the intentional act, but they cannot be merely formal; or put differently, what Kant specifies as a priori for malities, can be materially "filled in" with content, as in the case of spatial experience in dicated.
From sensible to categorial intuition:
One of the main claims of Kant's epistemology is the classical distinction between sensibility and the understanding. Both might stem "from a common root, which is, however, unknown to us" (CPR: B 29), but despite this "crypti cism" the distinction is a firm part of Kant's epistemology. The resistance to this distinc tion is nearly as old as Kant's philosophy, beginning with Fichte. The notion that intuition only pertains to the senses and, conversely, that conceptuality pertains to thought alone, has been found to be critique-worthy by different thinkers in different ways, but Husserl's rejection of this distinction is germane to his idea of phenomenology. For phenomenology's impetus to get to the "things themselves" implies a wide concept of "things." Things, to phenomenology, are phenomena insofar as they give themselves to a subject with the capacity to receive them. Thus, "things" can be a visual or auditive (sen sible in the broadest sense) object, but also an object of memory, a presentified object, but also a wished-for action or a loved or hated object. Thus, phenomenology's basic claim, formulated in the "principle of all principles," teaches "that each intuition afford ing [something] in an originary way is a legitimate source of knowledge, that whatever (Husserl 2014: 43) .
presents itself to us in 'Intuition' in an originary way . . . is to be taken simply as what (p. 52) it affords itself as, but only within the limitation in which it affords itself there"
Thus, intuition (Anschauung) is utilized by phenomenology in the broadest sense, as any thing that manifests itself in consciousness in different forms of intuition, thereby making itself evident in different forms. The notion that "non-sensible" things are not evident in the same form of "in the flesh" (leibhaftig) as sensible phenomena is an artificial privileg ing of objects "given to the senses." The contents of a wish or a will or the evidence of a mathematical proof have their own form of evidence that can be equally vivid.
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Husserl goes even further than that. He claims that intuition pertains to categories, which, for Kant, can never be intuited but rather make all intuition possible. Hence, we find here one of Husserl's most controversial claims-that there can be such a thing as categorial intuition.
Rather than using the terminology of objects of "sensible" and "super-sensible" percep tion (Husserl 2001a: 673) , Husserl prefers to call them "real" and "ideal" (Husserl 2001a: 674) . "Ideal" intuitions are founded upon real ones, such that Husserl can say, "we can characterize the sensible or real objects as objects of the lower levels of possible intu ition, the categorial or ideal ones as the objects of higher levels" (Husserl 2001a: 674) . In these higher acts, the categorial character of the intuition becomes grasped. "In such founded acts lies the categorial character of intuition and cognition, in them the judging thinking (where it functions as expression) receives its fulfillment: the possibility of per fect adequation to such acts determines the truth of the expression as its correctness" (Husserl 2001a: 675) . Thus, while the lower-level act sees a book as red, the categorial act has as its content the expression, "the book is red." They stand in a founda tional relationship. "For Husserl, categorial acts are founded on the sensory acts of per ceiving, but are not reducible to them" (Moran and Cohen 2012: 60) . Thus, categories have their own manner of givenness in the form of categorical intuition. It is not impor tant for the present context to explain what role categorial intuition plays in Husserl's theory of cognition. Suffice it to say that the very notion of an intuition of categories is a contradictio in adiecto to any Kantian. As a reaction to his critics, Husserl later clarified that the intuition of ideal objects and eidetic lawfulnesses-those that phenomenology de velops as a science-is not a "simple" intuition like a visual perception but involves an ac tivity he calls "eidetic variation" (cf. Husserl 1964: 410-20) . This clarification only corrob orates his basic idea that these ideal entities, no matter how we arrive at an experience of them (since cognition is a type of experience as well), are in some form given to con sciousness, manifest in the latter, and for that reason one can say that they, too, are "intu ited."
From deduction to reduction: With respect to Husserl's method of entry into transcenden tal phenomenology, one question that may be asked is why he uses the curious term re duction. While it is clear that the main meaning of the term is re-ducere, leading back to transcendental subjectivity, the term is still somewhat puzzling. The verbal analogy (p. 53) to Kant's central term deduction cannot be dismissed. 13 When it comes to the method of transcendental philosophy, reduction and deduction, respectively, can be used to term their methods. "Deduction" is Kant's crucial term for the task of justifying the knowledge claims on the part of the sciences, when intuitions are connected with con cepts to bring knowledge about. The term is not meant as a deduction from highest prin ciples, but as a justification as to why this procedure is appropriate. The term "deduc tion" stems from the legal language of his day, denoting a "justification" of accusations made in the courtroom. This becomes clear in the courtroom metaphor Kant uses, when he speaks of modern science putting nature on the witness stand. "Deduction" is, thus, the philosophical justification of existing and putatively true claims to knowledge, which the philosophical critique does not challenge; instead, the justification clarifies how these knowledge claims are possible.
To Husserl, justifying knowledge claims is a worthy enterprise, but recall that Husserl re jects the two-stem doctrine, hence justification (a term abounding in his writings) takes on a different meaning. What the phenomenologist needs to do is justify the fact of expe rience in general, to explain how experience becomes possible. This explanation must en sue constitutively, i.e., by showing how the objects of experience are constituted in tran scendental (inter)subjectivity. Thus, if we practice the "reduction," we reduce to the world-constituting transcendental subjectivity in all of its forms of experience, beginning with the most primitive, up to the highest, and in its intersubjective dimensions (the world is never constituted by a single subject). From this viewpoint, a justification of knowledge claims is not wrongheaded; it comes rather late in the process of justifying subjective deeds. Thus, both methods do not form a contradiction; it is rather Husserl's claim that the task of justifying knowledge claims in the scientific register accounts only for cognition, a very small portion of our engagement with the world, although the most dignified one. An account of the world as it is experienced as a life-world must begin from the lowest and most primitive levels until it can connect with the Kantian question. The highest form of justification reaches beyond Kant's scope; indeed, the highest level of jus tification is to justify oneself and one's actions as a person and ultimately as a philoso phizing subject.
Phenomenology as transcendental idealism:
The sum total of what has been said can be summed up in Husserl's version of transcendental idealism. As in Kant, transcendental idealism is compatible with empirical realism insofar as the idealist is not skeptical with respect to the empirical reality of the world, but understands the latter in terms of the world as given in the natural attitude, where the world is taken to exist independently of experiencing subjectivity. But the reduction to transcendental subjectivity reveals the nat ural attitude as constitutively dependent on this subjectivity. If the reduction is the true way to subjectivity in its world-constitutive activity, then "it is the royal road [Marschroute] to transcendental idealism" (Husserl 1959: 181) . This claim can be con nected to Kant's Copernican Turn. The turn from objects in themselves to the (p. 54) expe rience of objects (as phenomena) means that we cannot get beyond phenomena, but that we must account for them and our experience and cognition of them. Husserl would agree with this, but add that this account must begin with pre-predicative levels of expe rience all the way up to highest experience, manifest in judgments of cognition. Thus, when phenomenology, through the reduction, lays bare the correlational a priori between our experience of the world and that which gives itself therein, Husserl claims to have carried through with the Copernican Turn in its universality. For this reason he calls Kant's thing-in-itself a "mythical" remnant. Husserl follows the move Hegel made from transcendental to absolute idealism in that the very notion of a thing-in-itself (a thing not of possible experience) is counter-sensical. Any object that can be an object at all (for us), must be an object of actual or possible experience. Husserl never called his position "ab solute idealism," he prefers the notion "transcendental" idealism, which he "proves" (cf.
Husserl 2003)
. This "proof" lies not so much in a series of arguments, but rather in the execution of the intentional analyses themselves, which demonstrate that the world con stitutes itself as a world of experience, as the life-world. 
Neo-Kantianism
Neo-Kantianism was present in two different schools in Germany, the Marburg School and in Southwest Germany, at Freiburg and Heidelberg (the "Baden School"). Husserl was philosophically closer to Marburg. While Husserl had a considerable appreciation for the Marburgers, his assessment of the Southwesterners was for the most part critical. In the interest of space, I will confine myself to his relation to Marburg.
The Marburg School consisted, essentially, of Cohen and Natorp. Though they worked in unison to keep their school formation alive, they were not as close as one may have as sumed. Indeed, Cohen had forged his method in his reading of Kant, the "transcendental method," which Natorp publicly endorsed. However, Natorp (secretively) promoted his own idea of a philosophical psychology, which was critical of Cohen's position, though he took pains to present both as compatible. Husserl had things to say to both of them. The "true" transcendental method: For Cohen, Kant's crucial insight following the Coper nican Turn had to be turned into a method, the "transcendental method." This method is closely tied to the defining factum of our times: mathematical, natural science. This is the factum Kant meant, Cohen argued, when he devised his transcendental turn from the ob jects to the cognition of objects. After this turn, the objects meant can only be the objects that science constructs:
Not the stars in the heavens are the objects that this method teaches us to con template, but the astronomical calculations; those facts of scientific reality are, as it were, the real that is to be accounted for, as that at which the transcendental gaze is directed. What is the basis of this reality that is given in such facts? Which are the conditions of this certitude from which visible reality derives its reality?
Those facts of laws are the objects, not the star-objects. (Cohen 1877: 20f.) Thus the transcendental method had to start its regressive path from the factum of the sciences and reconstruct the logical conditions that make this factum possible. This is a scientific restatement of Kant's question regarding the conditions of the possibility of syn thetic a priori cognition. This method had to be implemented in all "directions" of culture, besides science, morality, and aesthetics. The net accomplishment of this investigation is a thorough critique of culture that was to supplant Kant's narrower critique of reason's capacities. This expansion of the critique was the defining idea of the Marburg School.
Husserl's critique of this method is not that it is altogether wrong, but that it rests on unclarified presuppositions:
All regressive "transcendental" methodology in the specific sense of the termmuch-used by Kant and preferred in neo-Kantianism-operates with presupposi tions, which are never systematically sought for, never scientifically ascertained, and, especially, not ascertained on the purely transcendental ground. . . . All re gressive methods obviously hang suspended in mid-air, as long as this ground is not given and prepared and as long as progressive methods of cognition have not been attained, of which the regressive method is in need of as positive presupposi tions. (Husserl 1956: 370) Phenomenology purports to provide this "positive" method, since it makes the ground up on which the sciences stand into a theme of research. Thus, "it is clear, accordingly, that the presupposition of the fact of science . . . has an entirely different meaning than the presupposition of a fact that is presupposed in the realm of the natural attitude and any natural science" (Husserl 1956: 371) . Every science stands on the ground of the natural attitude. Phenomenology, on the other hand, begins by questioning the presupposition of the natural attitude and delves, from there, into the depths of the subjectivity constituting it. It thereby does not render the transcendental method wrong, but relegates it to a high er-level problem that presupposes the foundational investigation that phenomenology provides: to study the constitution of that which makes possible all activities on the ground of the natural attitude, including science. While Kant (on this neo-Kantian read ing) clarifies the conditions of the possibility of cognition, Husserl clarifies the conditions of the possibility of every possible world-experience. It is the true foundational discipline and in this capacity "first philosophy."
Natorp: Transcendental psychology can only be transcendental phenomenology:
In the shadow of Cohen, Natorp developed transcendental psychology. This psychology should have the inverse direction of the transcendental method and offer an (p. 56) investigation into the psychological laws involved in producing culture. This project is motivated by the methodological problem all psychology faces, that to describe the mental, one interrupts the normal course of psychic life and thereby "kills" it. As Brentano says, when I am an gry, I cannot describe my anger, and when I do, I am no longer angry (see Brentano 2015: 30) . Hence, there lies a falsifying effect in the very notion of a self-description of the psy chic. The regressive method Natorp devises in reconstructing the psychic from its normal state of affairs, its factum, is meant to solve this problem. Yet, as his contemporaries al ready noticed, reconstruction does not avoid being constructive and thereby falsifying. 15 Husserl knew of these issues raised by Brentano and Natorp, and his solution is his claim that a just description of psychic states are possible through a change of attitude or a splitting of the ego into a "patent" and a "latent" ego (cf. Husserl 1959: 86-92). When I reflect on myself, what happens, in effect, is a splitting of the ego into an ego that reflects on a latent ego, while the reflecting ego is patent. This could occur ad infinitum in the natural attitude; but if I break with the natural attitude and establish a new attitude, that of phenomenology, I can gain a view of the life of the ego in its totality that does not dis tort it. Hence Husserl's name for the phenomenologist, "unparticipating observer," who is not uninterested in her own life, but does not participate in the constitution of the world in the natural attitude.
Husserl, however, appropriates from Natorp the idea of a reconstruction of depth struc tures of subjectivity that are lower layers upon which current acts rest. For instance, the current seeing of an object (described in "static" phenomenology) rests on a "thick" structure of cultural habituation, sedimented meaning structures. The latter is described by "genetic" phenomenology, and it can only fully execute its task after the break with the natural attitude. What was Natorp's "great premonition" (Husserl 2002 : 3) of a transcen dental-reconstructive science of the psyche becomes possible only through genetic phe nomenology. But one must not overlook Natorp's formative role in the development of Husserl's genetic phenomenology. 
Heidegger
Heidegger's view on Kant is most prominently presented in his book of 1929; it is equally a critique of the neo-Kantian interpretation of Kant. While it is tempting to read Kant and Indeed, this phenomenon that Dilthey forcefully brought to the forefront of the debate in the last decade of the nineteenth century is something that goes missing in biological or psychological accounts. Though biology deals with life, bios, biology treats it only as a natural phenomenon, an organic feature of living creatures. Psychology, the discipline treating the soul, as it was developed in the nineteenth century, also misses the originary phenomenon of life because it treats the psyche like every other science treats its subject matter: in an objectifying way. This is exactly where Heidegger latches on to the problem of Natorp's psychology; as Heidegger acknowledges, Natorp does recognize the problem. For Natorp sees the problem that to thematize the psychic means to miss its original life beat, that all thematization is one step removed from the original experience of life, and hence that every psychology "kills" its very phenomenon. But although Natorp sees the problem, he is unable to solve it; his method of "reconstruction" does not evade the fact that it is a form of construction; Heidegger comments:
Does the method of reconstruction achieve what it sets out to achieve? No. For one thing, it, too, is objectification. One must reject the notion that Natorp has made it intelligible that the meaning of method is different from that of objectiva tion [the method of the natural sciences]. . . . And it is not evident how through such a mediating thematization . . . the immediate is ever to be gained and achieved. (Heidegger 1987: 107) Yet Husserl's method of using the individual experience from the first-person perspective as a springboard for an eidetic analysis of the individual consciousness is no way out ei ther. For this method, too, no longer lives in the original experience. The solution can only be a method that lets life itself speak, without "killing" it through any scientific or philo sophical method. The project of letting life speak is, in this light, an (p. 58) anti-philoso phy. Heidegger calls it hermeneutics of facticity, which aims at a self-interpretation of life in its quotidian lifestyle, in "taking care of business" (Sorge) before any "idealizing" inter pretation from above. Such an interpretation does not press this life in the Procrustean bed of artificial distinctions, such as subject-object, theory-practice, etc. (cf. Heidegger 1995: 101-4).
Heidegger unfolds this program in Being and Time.
It is a hermeneutic laying-out of the categories of life as it is lived, as it lives itself in the creature who has an awareness of it:
factical Dasein, the human being in her "thereness," thrown into the world without a choice of whence, where, and whereto. This project is the result of Heidegger's critical rejection of the neo-Kantian "logification" of everything into a systematizing account. For this reason Heidegger rejected philosophical systems and canonic distinctions within doc trinal philosophy such as epistemology and ethics. 
Heidegger and Cassirer, and Kant
The finitude of the subject: Heidegger and Cassirer were invited to the Swiss town Davos in the spring of 1929 to present their views on Kant. From the outside, this may seem like a fairly academic affair; however, within academia this event bore significance as Cassir er was considered the eminence grise of neo-Kantianism and Heidegger the young rene gade of the new "existentialist" movement. The fact that Heidegger, only three years lat er, became one of the foremost thinkers of the Nazi movement and that the Jew Cassirer was forced to leave Germany, made the event auspicious in hindsight. 18 Though the dis cussion seems cordial and both afterwards did not attach too much weight to this meet ing, 19 it was perceived as a watershed event. "All" that happened was that both presented "their" Kant and used this interpretation to highlight the main lines of their philosophies. While neither Heidegger nor Cassirer articulated any novelties, the discussion brought their positions into clear relief. The event was important enough for Heidegger to pen his Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik so quickly that it appeared (p. 59) in the fall of that year. 20 It has become one of the most influential, though controversial, Kant interpreta tions. Hence, I will work my way backward from Heidegger's discussion with Cassirer, then turn to Heidegger's treatment of Kant.
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The dispute quickly turns to the question of what neo-Kantianism really amounts to. Hei degger criticizes the neo-Kantian reading of Kant for reducing Kant to the "theoretician of mathematico-physical theory of natural science" (Luft 2015a: 479) . Cassirer rejects this reading to be paradigmatic of neo-Kantianism: "The positioning of the mathematical sciences of nature is for me only a paradigm, not the whole of the problem" (Luft 2015a: 479) . To both, there is more at stake in Kant. What is it? Cassirer suggests-ever concilia torily-that it is the problem of freedom and its possibility (Luft 2015a: 479) , but Heideg ger puts the difference in a dialectical fashion: the different starting and end points of both ventures: "One could say that the terminus ad quem is [for Cassirer] a complete phi losophy of culture in the sense of clarification of the wholeness of the form of a structurecreating consciousness. The terminus a quo in Cassirer is completely problematical. My position is the opposite: the terminus a quo is my central problematic" (Luft 2015a: 482) . This starting point for Heidegger is finite Dasein in its thrownness, but this is also his ter minus ad quem. Heidegger even asserts that "what I designate with the term Dasein can not be translated by one of Cassirer's concepts" (Luft 2015a: 483) , an interpretation with which Cassirer agrees. To Cassirer, this Dasein and its life would be philosophically triv ial, were one to remain at the level of this radical individuation and not see that individ ual Dasein is capable of partaking in a common world of culture, something which "al ways already" happens (which Heidegger presupposes when committing his thoughts to paper). "The essential of the transcendental method lies in this, that it begins with a giv en. Thus I inquire into the possibility of the given called [e.g.] 'language.' How is it possi ble that we as one Dasein to another can understand each other in this medium" (Luft 2015a: 484) .
For Cassirer, the Kantian problematic of inquiring into the conditions of the possibility of the given (the transcendental method) comes into its own when it is applied to all regions of culture. Accordingly, his project is a rightful extension of the critique of reason into the critique of culture. Heidegger, in turn, interprets the Kantian problematic as raising, pre cisely, the issue of the individual Dasein, such that "it is the essence of (p. 60) philosophy, as a finite affair, that it is limited within the finitude of man" (Luft 2015a: 484) . Heidegger adds, God does not need philosophy; it is we humans who do. Kant as the philosopher of finitude? This is the thesis of Heidegger's "instructively idiosyncratic and challenging" (Dahlstrom 2013 : 110) interpretation of Kant, to which I turn now.
Heidegger's provocative title is "Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics." What is this problem? As he writes in 1965: "The problem for metaphysics, namely, the question con cerning beings as such in their totality, is what allows Metaphysics as Metaphysics to be come a problem" (Heidegger 1997: xxi) . "Metaphysics" is, thus, not a philosophical doc trine, but a title for the problem, to which metaphysics is the answer. Accordingly, Kant's Critique of Pure Reason is interpreted "as laying of the ground and thus of placing the problem of metaphysics before us as a fundamental ontology" (Heidegger 1997: 1). Kant's project is presented as Heidegger's avant la lettre. Heidegger interprets Kant's central question as to the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments as inquiring into the possibil ity of knowledge regarding the being of beings, of "ontological (and not merely ontic) knowledge." The latter "is hence a judging according to grounds (principles) which are not brought forth experientially" (Heidegger 1997: 9) . These principles are supplied by "our faculty of knowing a priori" (Heidegger 1997: 9) , pure reason. Thus, "laying the ground for metaphysics as unveiling the essence of ontology is 'Critique of Pure Rea son' " (Heidegger 1997: 10) . The question regarding the possibility of synthetic cognition a priori is a "derivative" problem that becomes possible once the fundamental one is clar ified.
Page 15 What Kant achieves is an ontology that is "modeled" on the ontological makeup of the be ing that does ontology, and that is Dasein. Citing the traditional interpretation of Kant, Heidegger asserts that "the Critique of Reason has nothing to do with a 'theory of knowl edge' " (Heidegger 1997: 11) , since it is not about the possibility of "ontic knowledge (ex perience)" (Heidegger 1997: 11) , but ontological knowledge; in Kantian terms, not about synthetic judgments a priori, but their possibility for finite Dasein. The fascination, al legedly for Kant, lies in the fact that finite Dasein can have access to infinity (ideality), transcending its finitude. This says nothing about infinite entities, such as mathematical axioms, but everything about Dasein. Thus, Heidegger shifts the viewpoint from the goal achieved (synthetic judgments a priori) back to the human being in its finitude. What does this say about this finitude? This is, to Heidegger, Kant's central, though concealed, question. Kant must have had an answer to it, since without one, the very project would collapse. Kant does not seem to have understood that he had such an answer. Only a "vio lent interpretation" can wrest this answer from Kant. Heidegger attempts to retrieve this question at the heart of Kant's enterprise by a "going back [needed] for carrying out the laying of the ground of metaphysics" (Heidegger 1997: 13) .
This finitude is firstly to be located in our sensibility, in "finite intuition" (Heidegger 1997: 24) , seen in our access merely to appearances, not "things in themselves." Moreover, (p. 61) the duality of sensibility and understanding characterizes us as finite, in that we need the "detour" through sensibility to then append categories of the understanding to the given. Ours is an intellectus ectypus, not archetypus, as is God's, who has access to things in themselves (see B 723). Heidegger interprets Kant's two-stem doctrine as yet another "proof" for our finitude. Heidegger takes Kant's famous allusion to the "common root" of sensibility and understanding as "go[ing] into and point [ing] consciously toward the unknown" (Heidegger 1997: 26) . Heidegger takes the reader on a Holzweg into this "unknown region."
The Transcendental Deduction becomes central to Heidegger's interpretation; to him, it is the "elucidation of finite reason as [its] basic intention" (Heidegger 1997: 50) . Heideg ger is among those (following Schopenhauer) expressing sympathy for the first edition of the Critique, 23 since Kant is less guarded regarding his "true" intentions, which Heideg ger intends to uncover. Kant's express purpose of the Deduction-which caused him "the most effort" (A xvi)-was to give a justification for the rightful production of synthetic a priori knowledge through "pure synthesis" on the part of the understanding. Thus, "I call the explanation of the manner in which concepts a priori can refer to objects the tran scendental deduction" (B 117). What justifies this synthesis that achieves this reference?
It is finite understanding which allows things to appear, to let them stand against . . . (Gegen-Stand, ob-iectum, cf. Heidegger 1997: 50-3) . "For a finite creature, beings are ac cessible only on the grounds of a preliminary letting-stand-against" (Heidegger 1997: 54) . This is achieved by a "unifying unity" (Heidegger 1997: 54) , "which has already been comprehensively grasped in advance through the horizon of time, which is set forth in pure intuition" (Heidegger 1997: 54) . Here, the theme of "time" is introduced, and it will become pivotal for Heidegger's interpretation. Kant is "the first and only one" (Heidegger 1996: 23) to have seen the connection between temporality and being, witnessed in Kant's observation that "all modifications of the mind . . . are subject to time . . . as that in which they must all be ordered, connected, and brought into relation with one another" (A 99, cf. Heidegger 1997: 57) . What enables these modifications to "be brought in relation" is the transcendental power of imagination; Heidegger cites Kant: "We thus have a pure power of imagination as a fundamental faculty of the human soul which serves as a basis for all knowledge a priori" (A 124, cf. Heidegger 1997: 59) . Thus, "the pure synthesis of the transcendental power of imagination . . . is relative to time" (Hei degger 1997: 59). How, then, does the power of imagination function?
Imagination is finite creatures' power "to make something intuitable, i.e., . . . to create a look (image) from something" (Heidegger 1997: 65) . Kant discusses how this is possible in the Schematism-chapter. To produce a schema is to make an appearance of something general, it is the visualization of a universal. It is this capacity on the part of the human being, which lets us gain access to ideal entities through an intuition by creating a rule under which they appear. "If the concept in general is that which is in (p. 62) service to the rule, then conceptual representing means the giving of the rule for the possible at tainment of a look in advance in the manner of its regulation" (Heidegger 1997: 67) . And "such making-sensible occurs primarily in the power of the imagination" (Heidegger 1997: 68) . The schema, thus, is the "possible presentation of the rule of presentation rep resented in the schema" (Heidegger 1997: 69) , such that Kant can say that the concept "always refers immediately to the schema" (Heidegger 1997 : from A 141/B 180). But how does this lead to time?
The transcendental power of imagination, as the "faculty of binding together (synthe sis)" (Heidegger 1997: 91) , is "productive," but not in the sense of an intuitus originarius, but as bringing to presence: "The productive power of imagination forms only the look of an object which is possible and which, under certain conditions, is perhaps also pro ducible, i.e., one which can be brought to presence" (Heidegger 1997: 92) . It brings into view "constant presence" (Heidegger 1997: 93) . Hence, "the pure productive power of imagination . . . makes experience possible for the first time" (Heidegger 1997: 93) . Thus, the transcendental power of imagination accounts for the fact that both sensibility and the understanding "necessarily hang together" (A 124). From this assessment arises Heidegger's most original interpretation of Kant, namely that it is nothing other than this transcendental power, which constitutes the root of the two stems of cognition (cf. Hei degger 1997: 97-9). It is a "ground in such a way that it lets the stems grow out of itself, lending them support and stability" (Heidegger 1997: 97) . To have unveiled this ground is Kant's great achievement, and this ground is the ground of metaphysics itself. Thus, "pure thinking" is "essentially intuitive" (cf. Heidegger 1997: 108), again pointing to Dasein's main "defect": the fact that we cannot intuit originarily, which is proven in the very root of our mind, the Gemüt, where the transcendental power of imagination resides. This "highest principle . . . speaks of the essential constitution of the human essence in general, to the extent that it is determined as finite, pure reason" (Heidegger 1997: 112 Kant and his followers; that there lies enough potential in Kant's philosophy to render phenomenology and its interests obsolete.
As this discussion has shown, such a reading neglects the catalytic effect Kant and the neo-Kantians have had on the development of phenomenology. Even in its most critical as pects, the main phenomenological import cannot be fully appreciated without a clear un derstanding that it was a rejection or transformation of key tenets of Kantianism. For in stance, to claim that "dumb experience" is not dumb and needs to be brought to speak through an analysis of consciousness's passivity, indeed the term "passive synthesis," could only be appreciated in its pushback against Kantianism. Also, the way in which the main phenomenologists disagreed with Kantianism is instructive, since phenomenology's counter-claims only come into relief against the backdrop they reject. Thus, whether or not the development of phenomenology is motivated by Kantianism, the way in which phe nomenology did things differently from Kant and his followers tells us a great deal about phenomenology.
2. A more radical position is that phenomenology has nothing to do with Kantianism. simply present an Aufhebung of Kant. It can also not be said that phenomenology makes Kantian claims obsolete. The Kantian notion of a deductive justification of the claims of knowledge from a factum is originally Kantian and has no equivalent in phenomenology. The same goes for the neo-Kantian contributions to the theory of science, as questionable as they were from the standpoint of phenomenology. Some newer research takes the stance that the mutual relationship is constructive, that these traditions can be seen as working out (differently, but constructively) solutions to common problems, such as the nature of transcendental philosophy, the threat of skepticism, and the role of philosophy in contemporary culture. 24 Newer scholars, in the spirit of overcoming the Continentalanalytic split, are thankfully no longer concerned with keeping the traditions separate, but see phenomenology and Kantianism as working on common problems that still occupy us today.
(p. 65) Thus, all of these interpretive standpoints have their merits and must be seen as contributing their part to a fair assessment of the relation between phenomenology and Kantianism in its various guises. Acknowledging the Kantian influence on phenomenology does not sell the latter's achievements short. On the other hand, insisting on the originali ty of phenomenology does not necessitate the killing of one of its fathers, nor does phe nomenology render all aspects of Kantianism moot. A fair and circumspect assessment of phenomenology in all of its forms and figures finds a good touchstone and starting point in Kant as well as any of the major representatives of the neo-Kantian tradition. This way of assessing the relation between Kant and his followers to phenomenology is, I would ar gue, true to this day. the imagination (see Jansen 2010); the role of aesthetics; the importance of religion, and other aspects. Thus the above account is very restrictive. The protocol of this dispute had already been circulated by then. One reason to quick ly write the Kant book was this "uncontrolled circulation," see the letter to Jaspers quot ed in the following footnote. Since the protocol continued to be circulated after the publi cation of the Kant book, Heidegger decided to publish it as an appendix to the edition of 1973. See Heidegger's immediate reaction to the dispute in the letter to Blochmann, from April 12, 1929: "Substantially-philosophically, I gained nothing . . . Cassirer was extreme ly polite in the discussion, almost too obliging. Thus I found too little resistance, which made it impossible to give the problems their proper acuity. Essentially, the questions were far too difficult for a public debate" (Heidegger/Blochmann 1989: 29f.) . 
